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The Employer's Dilemma: Quotas, Reverse
Discrimination, and Voluntary Compliance
INTRODUCTION
Congress' purpose in enacting Title VII' was to free all individuals
from employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.' Formal and informal remedial procedures were
devised to achieve this purpose.3 The framers of the Act created the
EEOC to foster an atmosphere conducive to informal procedures, or
voluntary compliance.4 They also provided a formal procedure: sec-
tion 706(g) of the Act.5 Courts, broadly construing that section, have
frequently granted preferential, or quota, relief' to aggrieved minor-
ity persons7 despite congressional' and statutory' warnings against
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 governs discrimination in employment. 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-h (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-h (1970).
2. 110 CONG. REc. 7212 (1964) (Clark and Case memorandum).
3. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1963), reprinted in [19641 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2401.
4. In order to aid employers in voluntarily complying with Title VII, the EEOC may issue
regulations and other types of guidance including advisory opinions, investigate charges, and
aid in conciliation. For the statutory duties of the EEOC, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 and § 2000e-
5 (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 and § 2000e-5 (1970). See also notes 47-52
infra and accompanying text for additional discussion of the EEOC's conciliatory powers.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally
engaged in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court
may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice,
and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but
is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay
(payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case
may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate.
6. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (allowed constructive
competitive seniority); Kirkland v. N.Y. State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d
Cir. 1975) (imposed temporary quota on police hiring and promotion); Morrow v. Crisler, 491
F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974) (suggested numerical hiring ratios, hiring halls, and/or a freeze on
white hiring). For exhaustive listings of types of preferential treatment, see Slate, Preferential
Relief in Employment Discrimination Cases, 5 Loy. CHI. L.J. 315, 318-20 (1974); 1974-75
Annual Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law, 16 B.C. IND. & COM.
L. REV. 965, 1068-73 (1975).
7. To avoid confusion, the following definitions will be used in this article: (1) the terms
"preferential treatment" and "quotas" are used interchangeably and include such practices
at any stage of the employment process; (2) "majority person" connotes a white person in
the context of racial discrimination and a male in the context of sex discrimination; (3)
"minority person" connotes any non-white racial group in the context of racial discrimination
and females in the context of sex discrimination; and (4) "prohibited classifications" include
race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.
8. The legislative history of Title VII suggests that Congress was opposed to the use of
quotas and added section 703(j) to the original House bill in order to ensure that no quotas
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such extensions of formal remedial procedures. Quotas operate per
se to evaluate individuals on the basis of prohibited classifications.'
When applied in favor of minorities, quotas result in reverse dis-
crimination against majority persons." Thus, implementation of the
Act may generate new discrimination as well as relief. This new
discrimination threatens both the general purpose of Title VII and
the effectiveness of voluntary compliance.
Two recent decisions exploring the problem of reverse discrimina-
tion dramatize the extent of the problem and the absence of an
appropriate and authoritative theory to adjust fairly the rights in-
volved. The United States Supreme Court in McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail Transportation Co. '2 held that white employees were entitled
to sue their employer for isolated acts of reverse discrimination.
However, the Court specifically avoided evaluating the permissibil-
ity of reverse discrimination where it is most likely to occur-in the
context of an affirmative action program.' 3
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia in
McAleer v. AT & T Co." attempted to tackle one of the problems
McDonald left undecided. The court concluded that the employer's
compliance with quota provisions in a consent decree'" was not a
would be imposed under the Act. See notes 29-33 infra and accompanying text for a discussion
of the legislative history of section 703(j).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2() (1970) provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee
subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to an individual or to any
group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual
or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total
number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
employed by any employer, referred or classified for employment by any employ-
ment agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or classified by any
labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other
training program, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of
such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, section,
or other area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section, or
other area.
10. For a definition of "prohibited classifications" as used in this article, see note 7 supra.
11. For a definition of "majority person" as used in this article, see note 7 supra.
The term "reverse discrimination" refers to discrimination against whites and/or males, the
traditional majority classes. However, in any particular instance, whites and/or males may
not in fact constitute a majority of the employees. See EEOC No. 74-31, 7 FEP Cases 1326
(1973) where the work force was substantially black.
12. 96 S. Ct. 2574 (1976).
13. Id. at 2578 n.8.
14. 416 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1976).
15. FEP MAN. (BNA) § 431:73-123 (E.D. Pa. 1973), as supplemented, EEOC v. AT&T
Co., 93 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) D-1 (E.D. Pa. 1975) [hereinafter cited as AT & T Consent
Decree]. A consent decree is a court-sanctioned settlement which the parties agree is a just
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defense to a reverse discrimination charge. The court's reasoning
suggests that any employer who is ordered to implement preferen-
tial treatment will incur liability for resulting reverse discrimina-
tion.
The employer whose work force does not mirror the racial or sex-
ual balance of the relevant labor market faces an urgent and poten-
tially costly dilemma. If he enters into a voluntary or court-
approved" affirmative action program which includes preferential
treatment, he may be forced to compensate majority victims of his
program.17 If he fails to institute a formal affirmative action pro-
gram, the employer leaves himself open to suits from any individual
or class of discriminatees. 1 He then faces potential court-imposed
quotas which may, in turn, lead to reverse discrimination suits. His
failure to comply with the Act voluntarily also forces the courts to
bear the entire burden of implementing Title VII.
This article will examine the sources and scope of the dilemma
currently facing the employer. It will examine the discouraging ef-
fect this predicament may have on the voluntary compliance pro-
cess. It will also suggest means which the courts and the EEOC
could use to establish an employer's obligation to reverse discrimi-
natees and, hopefully, to provide employers with consistent stan-
dards with which to fashion effective, reliable affirmative action
programs.
THE ACT AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION
Formal Remedial Procedures
In addition to remedying overt discrimination, courts interpreting
Title VII extend relief where facially-neutral employment practices
determination of their respective rights. The decree binds only the consent parties and not
the court. BLACK's LAW DIcrIONARY 499 (4th ed. 1968). Consent decrees have been held
immune from collateral attack. Black and White Children of Pontiac School Sys. v. School
Dist. of Pontiac, 464 F.2d 1030 (6th Cir. 1972); O'Burn v. Shapp, 70 F.R.D. 1029 (E.D. Pa.
1976).
16. Voluntary programs are those designed and implemented without any court interven-
tion. The EEOC, acting in its conciliatory capacity, may provide guidance to the employer
in fashioning a voluntary program, or the employer may design the program without EEOC
aid. Court-approved programs refer to consent decrees, which are designed by the EEOC and
the employer, but which are formally sanctioned by a court.
17. The reasoning of the district court in McAleer v. AT & T Co., 416 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C.
1976) suggests that any time an employer's affirmative action is arguably the result of his
past discrimination, he assumes responsibility for any subsequent reverse discrimination. See
text accompanying notes 73-79 infra for an extended discussion of the McAleer rationale.
18. It is clearly established that both Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) protect the
rights of minority persons or classes of persons to sue for discrimination. In McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 2574 (1976), the Supreme Court announced that white
persons may also invoke the protection of Title VII and § 1981.
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have the effect of discriminating against a protected class, 9 or where
they perpetuate the effects of past discrimination. 2 By broadly
construing section 706(g)'s authorization of remedial powers,2
courts have awarded wide-ranging relief to victims of overt discrimi-
nation. 22 Where past discrimination has been found, courts also
have ordered or sanctioned such preferential practices as construc-
tive competitive seniority,23 hiring ratios or the use of hiring halls, 2'
and freezes on white hiring.25 When fashioning such relief, courts
have avoided section 7030)'s prohibition against preferential treat-
ment 2 by restrictively interpreting the prohibition as applicable
only when the imbalance complained of was not due in any part to
the employer's past discriminatory practices.Y Some courts have
justified preferential relief by a "make whole" construction of sec-
tion 706(g); they contend that the section grants courts wide discre-
tion to fashion the most complete relief in order to nullify the dam-
age inflicted on victims of past discrimination.28
19. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
20. Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 987-
91 (5th Cir. 1969).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970).
22. Courts have consistently awarded broad non-preferential relief. See, e.g., Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (back pay); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424
U.S. 747 (1976) (constructive benefit seniority); Brunetti v. City of Berkeley, 12 FEP Cases
937 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (permanent injunction); McAleer v. AT & T Co., 416 F. Supp. 435
(D.D.C. 1976) (damages).
23. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
24. See, e.g., Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974). Many courts have ordered
preferential treatment to correct the effects of past discrimination. For an exhaustive listing
of the forms of preferential treatment, see articles cited at note 6 supra. See also Comment,
Employment Discrimination-The Use of the "Bumping" Remedy to Alleviate the Effects
of Past Sex and Race Discrimination, 28 Ru'maFs L. REv. 1285, 1289-91 (1975).
25. Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970).
27. United States v. Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers, Local 46, 471 F.2d 408, 412-13 (2d
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters, Local 638,
501 F.2d 622, 630 (2d Cir. 1974).
The fact that the House rejected Representative Dowdy's proposed amendments to Title
VII may indirectly support this restrictive interpretation of section 703(j). Dowdy's amend-
ments would have expressly prohibited discrimination in favor of any person and would have
specifically prohibited discrimination against Caucasian, white, and protestant American
citizens. By rejecting these amendments, Congress arguably avoided committing itself
unequivocally on the permissibility of quota relief. 110 CONG. REc. 2727 (1964).
28. The "make whole" theory was enunciated in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
450 (1975). The Supreme Court relied on legislative history to find that section 706(g) was
intended to give courts wide discretion to fashion extensive equitable relief. This relief was
designed to make victims whole by restoring them, as closely as possible, to the positions they
would have enjoyed absent the unlawful discrimination. 118 CONG. REC. 7168 (1972) (remarks
of Sen. Williams).
See also Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) where the Supreme Court
applied the "make whole" theory. The Court granted constructive competitive seniority to
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However, quota relief has not gone unchallenged. The argument
that any preferential treatment violates Title VTI finds substantial
support in the legislative history of section 703(j). The section reads:
"Nothing contained in this title shall be interpreted to require any
employer . . to grant preferential treatment to any individual or
any group. ... 1 However, the legislative history strongly suggests
that the section was intended to expressly prohibit the use of prefer-
ential practices by employers.
Senator Allott, in proposing an amendment that eventually be-
came section 703(j) of Title VII, stated that the amendment would
clearly establish that no quota system would be imposed under Title
VII." Senator Dirksen, in response to questions by Senator Wil-
liams, declared that the House bill as amended by section 703(j)
expressly provided that an employer would not have to maintain
any employment ratio, regardless of the ratio in the community.',
In their interpretative memorandum on Title VII, Senators Clark
and Case asserted that the Act made it unlawful for an employer to
discriminate against any individual.3" Senator Clark further noted:
No Employer is required to maintain any ratio of Negroes to
whites, Jews to gentiles, Italians to English, or women to men. On
an entire class of black job applicants and allowed the class to reapply for jobs with the
defendant company. In permitting the entire class to reapply, the Court recognized that some
of the class members might not have been actual discrimination victims. However, the Court
found overinclusive class-wide relief necessary to make the victims whole. The Court con-
tended that when the individuals reapplied, their status as actual discriminatees would be
evaluated. The Court implied that an applicant might not receive full constructive seniority,
but only if the employer could show that he had not been an actual victim. The essence of
the relief, nevertheless, was to give the class the fullest opportunity to achieve all the job
benefits they would have enjoyed had there been no original discrimination.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-20) (1970).
30. 110 CONG. REC. 9881, 9882 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Allott). But see NAACP v. Beecher,
504 F.2d 1017, 1028 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975), where the court held
that section 703(j) prohibits quotas only in those situations where the employer is not respon-
sible for the imbalance. See also Blumrosen, Quotas, Common Sense, and Law in Labor
Relations: Three Dimensions of Equal Opportunity, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 675, 692 (1974),
where the author suggests that section 703(j) may have been intended to have a narrow
scope-it may imply only that employment opportunities should not be arbitrarily allocated
on the basis of race, color, or sex without regard to the employer's culpability.
31. 110 CONG. REc. 14329 (1964) (letter of Sen. Dirksen). In addition, Senator Dirksen
wrote that the unamended bill could have been construed broadly enough to require an
employer who had a work force of 100 white employees, but whose plant was located in an
area with a 25 percent minority population, to fill subsequent vacancies with minority persons
almost without regard for an individual's job qualifications. Similarly, the requirement that
an employer's work force mirror the racial composition of the community would also apply if
the percentages of whites and minorities were reversed. He stated that either arrangement
would be discrimination in reverse, and that all applicants should be considered on the basis
of their qualifications and not on the basis of race.
32. 110 CONG. REc. 7212 (1964).
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the contrary, any deliberate attempt to maintain a given balance
would almost certainly run afoul of Title VII because it would
involve a failure or refusal to hire some individual because of his
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. What Title VII seeks
to accomplish, what the civil rights bill seeks to accomplish is
equal treatment for all.33
Despite the frequency with which courts have awarded it, prefer-
ential relief has not been granted uniformly or without question.
Some courts have recognized the dangers inherent in the present use
of preferential treatment of minority persons to remedy past prefer-
ential treatment of majority persons. Several courts have attempted
to balance the competing interests at stake in such proceedings," to
carefully evaluate the affected employees' "rightful places,"35 and
to limit or prohibit preferential relief accordingly.36
Several courts have, on occasion, rejected the use of quotas en-
tirely.37 In so doing they have noted the adverse effects quotas might
33. 110 CONG. REc. 7207 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark). See 110 CONG. REc. 8921 (1964)
where Senator Williams replies that:
The language of that title simply states that race is not a qualification for employ-
ment .... Some people charge that H.R. 7152 favors the Negro at the expense of
the white majority. But how can the language of equality favor one race or one
religion over another? Equality can have only one meaning, and that meaning is
self-evident to reasonable men. Those who say equality means favoritism do viol-
ence to common sense.
The legislative history of Title VII is entitled to great weight, since Congress was particu-
larly aware of the need for legislative history to guide the courts in interpreting and enforcing
the Act. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 431, 444 (1966).
34. See, e.g., Patterson v. Am. Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1976), where the court
upheld a back pay award to minority grievants but rejected the district court's orders to
"bump" majority employees and to combine seniority rosters at American Tobacco's two
plants. In evaluating this relief, the court attempted to limit it to the actual victims and to
those jobs which were actually involved in the past discrimination. The court actively at-
tempted to balance the need for some relief against the effects it might have on innocent
parties and against the adequacy of less drastic relief.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Navajo Freight Lines, 525 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1975), where
the court concluded that an investigation of the employees' "rightful places" was the best
means of balancing the interests at stake. Normally, persons selected for over-the-road driver
positions had to give up any accumulated seniority, but the court here allowed minority
applicants to retain their seniority. The court contended that compensation to wronged
minorities could not be obtained at the expense of the jobs of non-minority incumbents, but
that the discriminatees could achieve their rightful places at the expense of certain seniority
expectations of such incumbents.
36. For example, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the use of perma-
nent quotas for hiring and promotion in civil service jobs in Kirkland v. N.Y. State Dep't of
Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975). The Fourth Circuit reversed district court-
ordered "bumping" and refused to require an employer to combine seniority rosters at his
two plants. Patterson v. Am. Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1976).
37. See, e.g., Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973) (denied quota relief to fire
department employees); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Civ. Serv. Comm., 482 F.2d 1333 (2d
Cir. 1973) (rejected quotas for higher level police officers); Commonwealth v. O'Neill, 473
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have on the underlying principles of Title VII,11 on the reasonable
career expectations of white employees,39 and on racial tension at
the place of employment. 0
The separate opinion of Justice Powell in Franks v. Bowman
Transportation Co.4 summarizes several of the major problems with
preferential relief under Title VII. First, Justice Powell suggests that
the equitable remedies authorized by the Act should be a blend of
what is necessary, what is fair, and what is workable."2 Quotas may
be relatively easy to implement, i.e., workable. Second, however,
Justice Powell notes Congress recognized that total restitution
might not be feasible under Title VII. 4 If the Act does not mandate
total restitution, quotas may not be necessary remedies. Third, he
concludes that a grant of constructive competitive seniority to an
entire class of minority grievants is not always an appropriate equi-
table remedy, as it penalizes innocent white workers." In other
words, quotas may not be fundamentally fair.
Hiring quotas have also been criticized as being both overinclu-
sive and underinclusive; the beneficiaries of preferential treatment
F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973) (vacated district court-ordered quotas for police promotions). These
three cases were originally brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)
rather than under Title VII. However, the reasoning involved in evaluating quota relief is also
applicable under Title VII. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 2574
(1976). Additionally, remedies available under Title VII and the 1866 Act are virtually the
same. See Comment, Title VII and 42 U.S. C. § 1981: Two Independent Solutions, 10 U. RICH.
L. REV. 339 (1976).
38. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. O'Neill, 4 FEP Cases 1286, 1289-90 (3d Cir. 1972), where
the court attacked quotas in police hiring, stating: "[O]pening the doors long shut to minori-
ties is imperative, but in so doing, we must be careful not to close them in the face of others,
lest we abandon the basic principle of non-discrimination that sparked the effort to pry open
those doors in the first place."
39. See, e.g., Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Civ. Serv. Comm., 482 F.2d 1333, 1341 (2d
Cir. 1973), where the court rejected police force quotas for ranks above patrolman partly
because such quotas would discriminate against those whites who embarked on their police
careers with reasonable expectations of advancement. See also Note, Employment Discrimi-
nation: The Promotional Quota as a Suspect Remedy, 7 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 506, 518-19 (1976),
for a discussion of policy reasons for avoiding promotional quotas. The author suggests that
the courts should weigh the potential of promotional quotas for achieving the goal of economic
equality against the potential disturbing effects the quotas might have on productivity and
against the discriminatory impact they would have on majority workers. Id.
40. See, e.g., Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Civ. Serv. Comm., 482 F.2d 1333, 1341 (2d
Cir. 1973), where the court felt that police force quotas for ranks above patrolman would
exacerbate racial tension. The Second Circuit noted viable alternatives to quota relief. The
court suggested shortening the time lapse necessary to move from one level to the next and
also suggested eliminating or decreasing the effect of a 10 percent weighing of seniority in
promotion.
41. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
42. Id. at 790. (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).
43. Id. at 791 n.9 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).
44. Id. at 790-91 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).
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are not the actual victims of the past discrimination, and those
disadvantaged by the quotas normally have not been responsible for
the past discrimination and have not profited from it." Given the
legislative history of section 703(j) and the inconsistent application
of quota relief in recent court decisions, there is considerable confu-
sion as to the scope and underlying appropriateness of preferential
relief in employment discrimination."
Voluntary Compliance
Sections 705 and 706 of Title VIP7 demonstrate Congress' intent
to emphasize voluntary compliance as a vital means of implement-
ing the goals of the Act." These two sections created the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission and provided means by
which it was to promote an atmosphere conducive to voluntary com-
pliance. 9 Only after prescribed attempts at voluntary compliance
45. See Karst & Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REV. 955,
964-65 (1974).
46. See the discussion in Comment, Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981: Two Independent
Solutions, 10 U. RicH. L. REV. 339, 350 (1976), where the author submits that: "it is impossible
to reconcile a 'no preference' rule with quotas. However, it is perhaps equally impossible to
reconcile quota systems with constitutional guarantees, an anomaly with which the courts
have chosen not to deal."
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, e-5 (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, e-5 (1970).
48. The House Judiciary Committee demonstrated this intent:
No bill can or should lay claim to eliminating all of the causes and consequences
of racial and other types of discrimination against minorities. There is reason to
believe, however, that national leadership provided by the enactment of Federal
legislation dealing with the most troublesome problems will create an atmosphere
conducive to voluntary or local resolution of other forms of discrimination.
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1963), reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2393.
Several courts have also recognized this intent. See, e.g., Hutchings v. United States
Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 309 (5th Cir. 1970); Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 406
F.2d 399, 404 (5th Cir. 1969), appeal after remand sub nom., Hyler v. Reynolds Metal Co.,
434 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 912, rehearing denied, 404 U.S. 875
(1971).
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4(f)(3), (4) (1970) provide that the EEOC shall have power:
(3) to furnish to persons subject to this subchapter such technical assistance as
they may request to further their compliance with this subchapter or an order
issued thereunder; (4) upon the request of (i) any employer, whose employees or
some of them, or (ii) any labor organization, whose members or some of them, refuse
or threaten to refuse to cooperate in effectuating the provisions of this subchapter,
to assist in such effectuation by conciliation or such other remedial action as is
provided by this subchapter.
See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. 11, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1970),
which provides in pertinent part:
If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is reasonable
cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate
such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion. Nothing said or done during and as a part of such
Reverse Discrimination
have failed is the EEOC authorized to bring suit against the em-
ployer.5 EEOC regulations" and its guidebook for employers clar-
ify the procedures the Commission will use to conciliate and estab-
lish standards for effective affirmative action programs. The United
States Supreme Court has attested to the importance of voluntary
compliance by according great weight to EEOC pronouncements. 3
In addition to its informal conciliatory powers, the EEOC can fur-
ther voluntary compliance by negotiating consent decrees in its pro-
secutorial capacity.54 Though the Commission has no adjudicatory
powers of its own, its ability to investigate charges, conciliate, and
issue regulations and other forms of guidance can potentially save
many grievants from expensive litigation. However, this goal of vol-
untary compliance is currently being threatened by court-ordered
quotas, recent reverse discrimination decisions, and the EEOC it-
self.
THE McDONALD DECISION AND THE MCALEER RESPONSE
The decision in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.5
stands for one positive proposition and one disclaimer. The proposi-
tion is that both Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 proscribe discrimi-
nation in private employment against any individual, including a
majority person. The standards for proving a prima facie case and
for rebutting a defense, which were enunciated in McDonnell-
Douglas Corp. v. Green,6 apply equally to majority as well as to
informal endeavors may be made public by the Commission, its officers or employ-
ees, or used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding without the written consent of
the persons concerned.
See also FEP MAN. (BNA) § 431:51 (1975) for a further description of the provisions in Title
VII which create and administer the EEOC's conciliatory powers.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1970).
51. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1600-1611 (1976).
52. EEOC, AFFIRMATIVE AcTION AND EQUAL EMPLOYMENT, A GUIDEBOOK FOR EMPLOYERS
(1974) [hereinafter cited as EEOC GUIDEBOOK].
53. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
54. See, e.g., AT & T Consent Decree, supra note 15; Steel Industry Consent Decree, FEP
MAN. (BNA) § 431:125 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
55. 96 S. Ct. 2574 (1976).
56. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). To establish a prima facie discrimination case, the plaintiff must
show that: (1) he belongs to a racial minority; (2) he applied for and was qualified for a job
for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) despite his qualifications, he was rejected;
and (4) after his rejection, the positions remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of complainant's qualification. The McDonald Court, although
adopting these standards, found that these petitioners need not be members of a racial
minority and need not be victims of hiring discrimination. Rather, the Court stated that the
McDonnell-Douglas test was merely an illustration of how the character of the discrimination
could be established in the most common type of case and was not a substantive limitation
19771
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minority grievants. 7 Two white men, McDonald and Laird, and a
black man, Jackson, participated in the theft and resale of
company-owned anti-freeze. McDonald and Laird were discharged,
allegedly for their misconduct. Jackson was retained. Santa Fe con-
tended that it did not act under an affirmative action program" and
that it discharged the white employees for the commission of a
serious criminal offense.5" The company disclaimed any discrimina-
tory intent.8 0 Alternatively, Santa Fe claimed that if race were a
factor in its decision, it merely was allowing Jackson a "break" and
not discriminating against the white men.6
The Court decreed that Title VII prohibited racial discrimination
against whites and applied the same standards to them as would
have applied had the races been reversed.6 2 When an employer en-
gages in isolated discriminatory actions that are not based on any
formal affirmative action program, McDonald grants injured major-
ity individuals the same Title VII rights as are accorded minority
individuals.
The McDonald court expressly avoided any decision on the per-
missibility of similar preferential treatment implemented pursuant
to an affirmative action program. 3 However, reverse discrimination
suits are most likely to arise in the context of some sort of voluntary,
judicially-sanctioned, or judicially-ordered affirmative action pro-
gram, not in the context of isolated actions. By this disclaimer, the
Supreme Court has avoided a significant opportunity to clarify the
rights and duties of those employers most likely to need the informa-
tion.
of Title VilI's prohibition of racial discrimination. 96 S. Ct. at 2578 n.6.
McDonnell-Douglas also holds that after plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the employer to give a business necessity justification. Thereafter, the plaintiff has
the opportunity to demonstrate that the employer's justification was merely a pretext for
discrimination.
57. 96 S. Ct. at 2577-78.
58. Brief for Respondent at 19 n.5, McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct.
2574 (1976).
59. 96 S. Ct. at 2578.
60. Santa Fe insisted that it was motivated by McDonald's and Laird's conduct, not their
race. Id. at 2578.
61. Brief for Respondent at 16, McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 2574
(1976).
62. 96 S. Ct. at 2578.
63. Id. at 2578 n.8. The Court stated: "[Wie emphasize that we do not consider here the
permissibility of such a[n] [affirmative action] program, whether judicially required or
otherwise prompted." The Court's use of the term "permissibility" is doubly confusing to the
employer faced with a reverse discrimination suit as a result of his affirmative action
program. He does not know whether his program is lawful or not. Even if it is held lawful, or
permissible, he does not know whether such a finding will preclude liability to reverse discri-
minatees.
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In McAleer v. AT & T Co., 4 the District Court for the District of
Columbia announced standards that could govern those situations
avoided by McDonald. AT & T was bound by a consent decree
which required it to implement an affirmative action override-a
preferential promotion plan-when other means were insufficient to
meet its goals and timetables for achieving a racially and sexually
balanced work force."5 The consent decree specifically stated that
AT & T admitted no wrongdoing.66 The district court, however,
relying on statements by AT & T's counsel at oral argument and
statements by the judge who entered the consent decree, found that
AT & T had in fact violated Title VII. 7
Utilizing the override, AT & T promoted a woman with less sen-
iority than plaintiff McAleer to a position for which McAleer was
at least as well qualified, and to which he was entitled under the
collective bargaining agreement.6 8 The court awarded McAleer
damages on a "rough justice" 9 basis. However, the court denied
him the promotion, holding that the woman was entitled to her
promotion.7"
The court gave two justifications for its conclusion that McAleer
was entitled to damages. First, the court found that he was a blame-
less third party7" and that the entire burden of remedying past sex
discrimination should fall on the employer whenever possible."
Second, the court analogized to the contract doctrine of impossi-
bility of performance, holding:
64. 416 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1976). The McAleer case was decided two weeks before
McDonald. Nevertheless, it dealt with a type of situation that McDonald avoided, and that
generates an urgent current dilemma for employers.
65. AT & T Consent Decree, supra note 15, at § 431:117.
66. Id. at § 431:73.
67. 416 F. Supp. 435, 439 (D.D.C. 1976).
68. Id. at 437.
69. Id. at 440. The court did not have an opportunity to clarify the meaning of "rough
justice," as the parties later agreed to a settlement giving McAleer $7,500 in damages and
$6,500 in attorneys' fees. 181 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-1 (Sept. 16, 1976).
70. The court relied on Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) in upholding
the woman's promotion. They found that AT & T had in fact been guilty of past discrimina-
tion as had the defendant in Franks. As the Franks decision authorized broad relief including
constructive seniority, the McAleer court concluded that constructive seniority in the form
of an affirmative action override was an appropriate remedy. Therefore, the woman's promo-
tion pursuant to that provision was appropriate.
71. 416 F. Supp. at 439-40. But see Comment, The Myth of Reverse Racial Discrimina-
tion: An Historical Perspective, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 319, 328-29 (1974) for the alternative
theory that although one in a position similar to McAleer's might be innocent of any inten-
tional wrongdoing, he might have unjustly benefited from the prior discriminatory practices
that allegedly precipitated the consent decree.
72. 416 F. Supp. at 439-40.
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Ordinarily one who acts pursuant to judicial order or other lawful
process is protected from liability arising from the act. . . But
such protection does not exist where the judicial order was necessi-
tated by the wrongful conduct of the party sought to be held lia-
ble.7"
For the first half of this proposition, the court relied on the theory
that one who acts pursuant to an administrative ruling may be
exempt from criminal liability for his actions74 or may be discharged
from conflicting contractual obligations." However, as the court
noted, this impossibility doctrine generally applies only when the
supervening force causing the conflict was not triggered by the de-
fendant's own wrongdoing."
In the McAleer consent decree, AT & T specifically disclaimed
any wrongdoing." Ignoring the decree's language and function, the
court reasoned that it was in fact brought about by AT & T's initial
discriminatory actions." The court, as a result of this apparent find-
ing of wrongdoing, rejected the impossibility doctrine as a defense
to plaintiff's charge and held AT & T liable for injuries caused by
its compliance with the decree. If this reasoning is appropriate, any
73. Id. at 440.
74. See United States v. Mancuso, 139 F.2d 90, 92 (3d Cir. 1943).
75. See Pepsico, Inc. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 179, 190 (2d Cir. 1972). The impossibility doctrine
has traditionally been applied to exempt individuals from private contractual obligations
which conflict with a binding judicial decree. McAleer would use the doctrine to evaluate
an employer's liability to reverse discriminatees whose statutory rights conflict with the
employer's implementation of a consent decree or court order. Whether or not the doctrine
would protect an employer in any given situation, it is arguably inappropriate to use the
doctrine at all in employment discrimination cases. The doctrine may relieve a person of
private, voluntary contractual obligations when they conflict with a supervening and more
authoritative court-imposed obligation. Involuntary statutory obligations are at stake in em-
ployment discrimination cases. It is at best questionable whether such congressionally-
mandated obligations should be subordinated in any situation to an individual judicial de-
cree. See text accompanying notes 108-09 infra for an alternative exemption that does not
place judicial decree above statutory rights.
76. See, e.g., Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (1863), where the
defendant was discharged from a contractual agreement to furnish a music hall to the plain-
tiff when the music hall burned down through no fault of the defendant. The defendant's
contractual obligation would also be excused where, through supervening legislative action,
the underlying obligation of the contract was deemed illegal or contrary to public policy. See
generally Note, The Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance and the Foreseeability Test, 6
Loy. Cm. L.J. 575 (1975).
77. See AT & T Consent Decree, supra note 15, at § 431:73 for AT & T's specific dis-
claimer of wrongdoing. In addition, a consent decree is not by nature an arrangement
based on judicially-recognized wrongdoing. It is a settlement by the parties which is sanc-
tioned by the court, but it does not operate as an admission of wrongdoing even in the absence
of a formal disclaimer.
78. See text accompanying note 67 supra. These actions precipitated the initial charge
by the EEOC which led to the consent decree in question.
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court-ordered quota relief would subject the employer to reverse
discrimination suits because quota relief has only been granted
when wrongdoing, in the form of past discrimination, is estab-
lished.79 Any employer who institutes a voluntary affirmative action
program or agrees to a consent decree utilizing preferential treate-
ment could be vulnerable to reverse discrimination attacks on the
same theory the court here espoused: there would have been no need
for preferential treatment had the employer not engaged in prior
discrimination. The McA leer court's application of the impossibility
doctrine gives the employer no protection from reverse discrimina-
tion claims. In fact, an employer's good faith effort to comply with
Title VII may generate as many problems as it solves.
THE EMPLOYER'S DILEMMA
Recent decisions ordering preferential relief support the proposi-
tion that the employer must bear the entire burden of remedying his
past discriminatory practices. McDonald stands for the proposition
that an employer is liable for isolated discriminatory acts against
any individual. McAleer suggests that he may be liable to majority
individuals who are injured by his compliance with any affirmative
action program that was precipitated by his wrongful conduct. Nev-
ertheless, Title VII's focus is on voluntary compliance. The em-
ployer whose work force does not mirror the relevant labor market
faces a pressing dilemma. He has several available options, but each
has serious drawbacks.
The employer's initial option is to institute a voluntary affirma-
tive action program. This alternative furthers Title VII's goal of
voluntary compliance and provides the employer with the opportun-
ity to fashion, free from court intervention, a program tailored to his
needs and resources. He may rely on the EEOC Guidelines, ° the
EEOC Guidebook for employers,8 ' or the provisions of recent con-
79. See, e.g., recent cases in which quota relief has been denied because there was an
insufficient finding of past discrimination. In Chance v. Bd. of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993 (2d
Cir. 1976), the Second Circuit reversed a district court-ordered quota for a teacher "excess-
ing" plan on the ground that the original plan did not in fact disproportionately affect
minorities. In Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Pa. 1976),
the court struck down a provision in a collective bargaining agreement authorizing quota
hiring on the ground that there was no evidence of past discrimination. The court held that
absent any court decree, an employer could not implement a quota system that operated to
discriminate against whites. In Brunetti v. City of Berkeley, 12 FEP Cases 937 (N.D. Cal.
1975), the court held that the "extreme" remedy of quotas under a voluntary affirmative
action program was not appropriate where there was no definite finding of prior discrimina-
tion and no prior challenge to the city's prior practices.
80. 29 C.F.R. § 1600-1611 (1976).
81. See, e.g., EEOC GuIDEBOOK, supra note 52.
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sent decrees.2 The Guidebook suggests that he establish long range
and intermediate goals and timetables for integrating underutilized
groups into his work force. 3 Practically, of course, preferential treat-
ment is necessary to insure the success of these programs. As one
means of meeting these timetables, the Guidebook suggests compil-
ing a Remedial Action File of minority persons who are qualified for
promotions and using that file first to fill available promotions. 4
The Guidebook further notes that union referrals must be made
without discrimination. Notwithstanding this instruction, however,
it cites with apparent approval decisions which have ordered prefer-
ential union referrals.85 These Guidebook suggestions seemingly
condone preferential treatment.
The employer may also look to consent decrees as models for his
affirmative action program. He may find that they also condone
preferential treatment. The AT & T consent decree, for example,
includes an affirmative action override8 -a program for preferring
minorities for promotions if necessary to meet goals and timetables.
If the employer relies on either of these sources he will hopefully
eliminate minority discrimination, but he may thereby generate a
new group of majority discriminatees. The Mc A leer rationale offers
him no protection from reverse discrimination suits. McAleer's im-
possibility defense would apply, if at all,87 only when the employer
acts pursuant to a judicial decree. McAleer settled for $7,500. Using
that figure as a yardstick, such suits may be very costly.
If the employer chooses not to enter into any formal program, he
is vulnerable to suit by any individual or class that can prove a
82. See, e.g., AT & T Consent Decree, supra note 15. If the employer is a government
contractor he is also subject to Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974), reprinted in 42
U.S.C. § 2000e, at 10294 (1970) and will be subject to the regulations of the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance, 41 C.F.R. §§ 60.1-60-60.9 (1975).
83. EEOC GUIDEBOOK, supra note 52, at 26-28.
One commentator remarked that goals and timetables themselves often closely resemble
quotas. Unless an employer can resort to preferential treatment, neither he, nor the EEOC,
nor the courts can ensure that the goals and timetables will be achieved. Sape, Use of
Numerical Quotas to Achieve Integration in Employment, 16 WM. & MARY L. REv. 481, 487
(1975).
84. EEOC GUIDEBOOK, supra note 52, at 50.
85. Id. at 58.
86. AT & T Consent Decree, supra note 15, at § 431:117.
87 Despite the McAleer court's conclusion that AT & T's actions were not protected by
the impossibility doctrine, the court implied that the doctrine was a viable means of evaluat-
ing. the consequences of AT & T's compliance with a consent decree. There is no judicial
involvment in the voluntary program described in this section, so the impossibility doctrine
is of no value to the employer. See note 75 supra for a discussion of why this doctrine may
never be an appropriate method for evaluating an employer's responsibilities to reverse discri-
minatees.
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prima facie case against him. The courts have consistently awardedbr oa relief to minority victims of discrimination. " McDonald as-
serts that, at least where there is no affirmative action program, the
employer is also potentially liable to majority individuals. Santa Fe
posited that if race was a factor in its decision to retain Jackson, it
was merely giving him a "brea'k." s The Court found that such ac-
tion, regardless of label, constituted discrimination. Therefore, if
the employer attempts to informally aid minorities, he will be liable
under McDonald if majority individuals are thereby disadvantaged.
In addition, his inaction retards the process of eradicating discrimi-
nation and frustrates Title VII's objective of voluntary compliance."
If a minority person files a charge with the EEOC, the employer
may enter into a consent decree and set up an affirmative action
program to remedy his alleged misconduct. If the EEOC concludes
that the employer has been perpetuating the effects of past discrimi-
nation, the consent decree may include quota requirements similar
to the affirmative action override in the AT & T consent decree.9 If
the employer complies with the decree, he necessarily disadvantages
majority individuals. McAleer suggests that he may be liable for
damages to those persons, even though he is bound to comply with
the decree.2 Unless the employer cannot afford the immediate cost
of continuing the suit, he may be reticent to enter into a potentially
expensive and dangerous judicially-enforceable decree. He is likely
instead to fight the case in court or to protract the settlement pro-
cess as long as possible. This result thwarts the voluntary compli-
ance process and shifts the burden of implementing the Act onto the
courts and the EEOC. The EEOC has a current backlog of approxi-
mately 106,000 cases. 3 Protracted settlements or increases in the
number of suits proceeding to trial can only further burden the
Commission and the courts, thereby delaying relief and severely
retarding the very process that preferential treatment was designed
to expedite.
Finally, if the employer does choose to go to court, recent cases
suggest that the court may impose a program including preferential
88. See notes 22-28 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the types and scope
of relief awarded.
89. Brief for Respondent at 16, McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 2574
(1976).
90. See notes 47-54 supra and accompanying text which discuss Title ViI's emphasis on
voluntary compliance.
91. AT & T Consent Decree, supra note 15, at § 431:117.
92. 416 F. Supp. at 440.
93. 93 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 1, News and Background Information 1 (Sept. 6, 1976)
(remarks of acting chairperson Ethel Bent Walsh).
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treatment." A quota forces the employer to evaluate applicants or
employees on the basis of classifications prohibited by Title VII. He
is bound to comply, though he has no control over the scope or
inclusiveness of the quota. In addition, under the McAleer reason-
ing, his compliance with the order will be no defense to reverse
discrimination suits because such orders are only issued to remedy
past discrimination. The burden of compensating reverse discrimi-
natees is an additional cost he must bear. Unless the employer is
reasonably certain that he can prove his practices are non-
discriminatory in effect or justifiable by a non-pretextual business
purpose,95 it may be dangerous to go to court. Additionally, litiga-
tion, unlike voluntary compliance, is a time consuming process. It
undermines Title VII's goal of providing prompt relief from discrim-
ination." Whether the employer chooses a voluntary method or liti-
gation, he faces substantial liability.
CLARIFYING THE EMPLOYER'S LIABILITIES TO REVERSE DISCRIMINATEES
There is little doubt that courts will hold employers responsible
for almost all costs of eradicating past and present employment
discrimination. The justification for placing this burden on employ-
ers is that the primary purpose of Title VII is to eliminate any and
all employment discrimination. 7 The principal issue, however, is
not whether this burden is theoretically justifiable, but whether the
burden is practically desirable when balanced against: (1) the po-
tential impairment of the voluntary compliance process, and (2)
inherent inconsistencies in quota relief both in theory and as applied
by the courts.
Considering the enormous current EEOC backlog, voluntary com-
94. See notes 6 and 23-25 supra and accompanying text for examples of court-ordered
quota relief.
95. It is difficult for an employer to rebut a prima facie discrimination case. He must
establish a legitimate business justification for his actions. The courts have very narrowly
construed the scope of appropriate business purposes. Even if the defendant is successful in
establishing a defense, the plaintiff has the opportunity to defeat the defense by showing that
it is merely a pretext for discrimination.
96. Santa Fe stated the dilemma more caustically: if the employer promotes a program
to assist minorities, he gets a pat from the EEOC and a suit by whites. If he refuses to
implement an affirmative action program, he incurs the wrath of the EEOC. Brief for Respon-
dent at 22, McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 2574 (1976).
97. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1963), reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEWS 2401. The McAleer court went so far as to impose damages on an employer
for following a court order to discriminate against men. For an excellent discussion of Title
VII as intended and as implemented, see Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term-Foreword:
In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976).
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pliance is essential to ensure prompt relief to discriminatees With-
out it, the backlog can only increase, postponing relief even further
and frustrating the EEOC's function as a conciliatory agency. The
threat to the voluntary compliance process caused by the current
burden on employers weighs heavily in any efforts to evaluate the
practicality of continuing the burden.
As to the second balancing factor, preferential treatment as sug-
gested by the EEOC and as imposed by the courts is subject to
serious question. As previously discussed, some courts doubt the
appropriateness of quota relief in any situation.9 In addition, com-
mentators have recognized inconsistencies between preferential re-
lief, its consequences, and the goals of Title VII.'"' One question that
has arisen is whether racial quotas acually reflect the correct class
of disadvantaged persons. It has been suggested that cultural disad-
vantage is the real discriminatory factor. If so, racial quotas used
to eliminate that discrimination may be both overinclusive and
underinclusive; not all persons are equally culturally disadvan-
taged, and not all persons affected by cultural disadvantage may be
members of racial minorities.'' Another theory is that courts which
order quota relief are implicitly deciding that work force integration
98. There has been considerable debate as to whether the arbitration process can absorb
some of the cases, ease the burden on the EEOC, and provide an inexpensive, prompt,
specialized forum for grievants. The Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36 (1974) held that arbitration of a Title VII claim did not preclude an employee's redress
to the courts. However, the case did suggest that the Court might defer to the arbitrator's
award if the arbitrator conducted the proceeding in accordance with certain procedural safe-
guards. Id. at 60 n.21. The abitration process should not be discounted as a potential tool for
alleviating some of the EEOC's current backlog. See generally Edwards, Arbitration of Em-
ployment Discrimination Cases: A Proposal for Employer and Union Representatives, 27 LAB.
L.J. 265 (1976); Note, The Potential Of Expanded Arbitration In Resolving Title VII Claims
In Light Of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver And New Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission Policy, 7 Loy. Cmi. L.J. 334 (1976).
In addition, the EEOC recently announced that it was beginning to implement accelerated
procedures to resolve some of the older claims. 93 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 1, News and
Background Information 1 (Sept. 6, 1976). The short-range goal of that plan is to wipe out
approximately 12,000 cases, so a crushing backlog still exists.
99. See notes 37-44 supra and accompanying text.
100. See Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment
of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Posner]; Kaplan,
Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special
Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Kaplan].
101. See Kaplan, supra note 100, at 374, where the author suggests replacing racial quotas
with preferential treatment of an "underclass" based on cultural disadvantage. Evaluation
based on that classification would not violate Title VII. See also Posner, supra note 100, at
12-13, where the author notes the further problem of how to define race for the purposes of
racial quotas. Whether race is defined in terms of physical characteristics, surnames, racial
or national ancestry, or standards set by the racial group itself, such determinations are at
best inexact and open to considerable abuse.
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should proceed more rapidly than is possible through non-
discriminatory hiring. If courts are acting under this assumption,
they are apparently ignoring those portions of the legislative history
and text of Title VII which specifically proscribe preferential treat-
ment.102
No factor may outweigh the importance of holding the employer
responsible for all costs of eliminating discrimination. However, the
inequities inherent in quota relief mandate a careful re-evaluation
of the permissible scope of preferential treatment. The recent deci-
sions in McDonald and McAleer demonstrate an urgent need to
clarify the effect of preferential treatment on an employer's liability
for reverse discrimination claims, especially claims precipitated by
an employer's compliance with voluntary, court-sanctioned, or
court-ordered affirmative action programs. In short, there is a de-
monstrable need for the courts and the EEOC to take action regard-
ing the types of reverse discrimination not addressed in McDonald.
The EEOC Guidebook is a potentially valuable aid to employers
if it accurately reflects the standards the EEOC and the courts use
to evaluate an employer's affirmative action program. However,
current EEOC attempts at guidance may mislead the employer who
wants to design a voluntary plan. The Guidebook condones prefer-
ential treatment both directly and indirectly. 03 Such treatment, if
appropriate at all in the absence of a court finding of past discrimi-
nation, may induce costly reverse discrimination suits. If the Guide-
book is to realize its potential and be worthy of trust, it should be
updated to thoroughly inform employers of the consequences of fol-
lowing its suggestions.
One experienced practitioner 4 suggested that the EEOC has an-
other tool to encourage voluntary compliance. The EEOC has the
power to issue advisory interpretations and opinions; however, that
power has been exercised only once in 11 years.0 5 Although the
EEOC has no adjudicatory powers, such advisory opinions could
provide useful public information to employers with unique employ-
ment problems. Additionally, the opinions could suggest the reason-
102. See notes 29-33 supra and accompanying text for discussion of section 703(j) and its
legislative history.
103. See notes 81-85 supra and accompanying text for examples of the Guidebook's ap-
proval of quotas.
104. See 93 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) News and Background Information 69 (Sept. 27, 1976),
where R. Lawrence Ashe, an Atlanta attorney experienced in litigating Title VII claims,
criticized the EEOC for its failure to utilize tools available to it to effectively guide employers
in formulating affirmative action programs.
105. Id. at 69.
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ing the EEOC might use if it were investigating or prosecuting a
similar case.
The courts, for their part, should clarify whether preferential
treatment pursuant to consent decree or court order is permissible.
Also, they should decide what effect such treatment will have on the
employer's subsequent liability to reverse discriminatees. McAleer
offers one possible answer: court-ordered preferential treatment
may be an appropriate method of redressing the effects of past
discrimination. However, the court order will be no defense to, and
may provide justification for, subsequent reverse discrimination
suits. McA leer suggests that the employer should pay all costs of his
past wrongful conduct. The employer should, therefore, be liable to
majority individuals whose Title VII rights are impaired when he
implements the decree on the theory that such decrees will always
be precipitated by his wrongful conduct. 06 One difficulty with this
strict liability theory, however, is that it is likely to discourage em-
ployers from voluntarily entering into consent decrees. 07 A second
difficulty is that an employer could be liable for injuries he did not
cause, even indirectly. If class-wide preferential relief is ordered to
remedy the effects of past discrimination, some majority individuals
will likely be displaced by minority persons who were not actually
victims of the past discrimination." 8 Under McAleer, the employer
may have to compensate majority individuals whose injuries did not
result from his past discrimination, but from an overinclusive rem-
edy.
There is, however, a way to encourage employers to enter into
consent decrees without sacrificing relief to victims of discrimina-
tion. Employers instituting quotas pursuant to a consent decree or
court order could, under certain circumstances, be exempted from
reverse discrimination liability. This exemption might alleviate
some of the discouraging effect reverse discrimination liability may
have on employers' willingness to enter into consent decrees. More
importantly, it would not impair the courts' ability to compensate
minority victims of past discrimination.
106. It must be noted that McAleer does not serve as a binding precedent, as it was
dismissed with prejudice in September, 1976 pursuant to a damage settlement after judg-
ment. Nevertheless, the scope of AT & T's liability to reverse discriminatees under its consent
decree will receive further treatment in the appeal from the district court decision in EEOC
v. AT & T Co., 13 FEP Cases 392 (E.D. Pa, 1976). District Court Judge Higganbotham, who
entered the original consent decree, upheld challenges to the decree's affirmative action
override provision based on civil rights and labor statutes, an executive order for government
contractors, and the Constitution.
107. See text accompanying notes 91-93 supra for a discussion of this discouraging effect.
108. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 774-75 (1976).
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The appropriate scope of this exemption, however, depends on the
appropriate scope of the underlying quota. Given section 703(j)'s
prohibition of quotas and similar warnings in the legislative history
of the Act, courts should limit quota relief so as to benefit only thosL
individuals actually injured by the past discrimination. If courts
can avoid overinclusive quotas, those majority individuals whose
positions are subsequently adjusted should be the ones who unjustly
benefited from the original discrimination. If they have enjoyed the
illicit benefits, or "windfall," caused by mistreatment of others, it
is arguable that they will not be injured by limited quota relief.
Rather, they will be returned to their rightful places under terms
and conditions which would have applied had there been no dis-
crimination.'"9 This theory achieves its greatest utility in cases in-
volving promotional, rather than hiring, quotas, as it is probably
easier to narrow the impact of quota relief on all individuals where
those individuals were identifiable at the time of the employer's
discriminatory action.
Under these circumstances, an exemption for employers makes
both theoretical and practical sense. It does not conflict with Title
VII's goal of eliminating the effects of past discrimination. It does
not deprive any legitimately injured individual of relief. Further-
more, the limit on the exemption should emphasize the courts' and
the EEOC's responsibility to avoid overinclusive preferential relief
which unnecessarily disadvantages majority persons.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of Title VII is to eliminate all traces of employment
discrimination, to prevent it from recurring, and to compensate its
victims. Voluntary compliance is a crucial means of achieving all of
these ends. Courts have deemed quota relief an additional appropri-
ate means of remedying past discrimination, and the EEOC has
supported that stand in its efforts to guide employers. However,
majority victims of formal and informal quotas have begun to com-
plain. The Supreme Court has upheld their right to complain under
Title VII. At least one district court has awarded damages to a
majority person injured by his employer's compliance with a quota
provision in a consent decree.
Faced with quota relief and these two decisions, the employer is
109. See Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at
4, McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 2574 (1976); Comment, The Myth of
Reverse Racial Discrimination: An Historical Perspective, 23 CiEv. ST. L. REV. 319, 325
(1974).
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caught between the rock and the whirlpool. Whether or not he acts
in good faith, whether or not he acts at all, he cannot effectively
implement Title VII and protect himself from liability at the same
time. Consequently, he is likely to take no action. That result
thwarts the crucial voluntary compliance process and impedes the
very remedial processes the Act was intended to expedite. The em-
ployer must know what kind of affirmative action he can take. He
must know what his actions will cost him, but he should not be
forced to pay for the overinclusiveness of a court-imposed quota. It
is up to Congress, the courts, and/or the EEOC to give him this
guidance. Finally, as voluntary compliance is vital, it is up to Con-
gress or the courts to grant him some relief.
JANET L. REED
